Postscript: Nunavut and the TFN Settlement

Ron Doering

While the federal policy has attempted to deal with them as separate issues, calls for a Nunavut territory and the Inuit land claim in the eastern Arctic have always been intricately intertwined. From the outset, the Inuit have maintained that Nunavut is, as Bob Kadlun has said, "the core demand on the Inuit agenda, with the claim as one means of obtaining it". However, at certain times emphasis has been placed on claims issues; at others, more progress has been made in political development. As circumstances have shifted, the positions of the federal and territorial governments have not always been clear.

The recent joint letter from the GNWT and TFN to the Prime Minister said that the agreement-in-principle is "unlikely" to receive ratification in the North unless Nunavut is guaranteed. While the letter was a useful goad to the feds, both the GNWT and TFN backed away from an unequivocal statement that, without Nunavut, there will be no settlement. There is little or no support for Nunavut in the Mackenzie Valley, and the support of the territorial government may be more shallow than their public position indicates. The Government of Canada would be happy to have the claim settled without Nunavut. Only TFN can require it.

Nor does the wording of Article 4 of the agreement-in-principle do anything to clarify the situation. It is interesting to contrast the vague wording of Article 4 (the Nunavut section) with the very precise and final wording of Article 2, part 8 (with the ironic heading of Certainty") in which the Inuit consent in the final agreement to extinguish their aboriginal title forever.

While some of this lack of clarity has served all parties well over the last decade, no such ambiguity should be permitted when all citizens of the N.W.T. vote in the plebiscite on the boundary planned for late next spring and when the Inuit of Nunavut are asked to ratify the proposed final agreement next fall.

The arguments for making Nunavut a pre-condition to the settlement of the claim are compelling.

1. The only reason that TFN might agree to extinguishment (when all other aboriginal groups are backing away from it) is that Nunavut provides a safety net for long-term control of their lives not available to other groups. Without Nunavut, the TFN agreement is simply an oldstyle, cash-and-land treaty (with some resource management provisions) that, understandably, will not likely be ratified by Inuit in any event.

2. For its implementation, most of the TFN agreement assumes a Nunavut government. It would politically illegitimate (and practically difficult) for the existing territorial government to implement the terms of such joint management regimes as the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board.

3. Nunavut and the TFN settlement create a complex situation in the West. Some people argue against Nunavut because it is the creation of the other territory that is so difficult. On the other hand, the failure of both major claims in the N.W.T. can only mean that there is a fundamental problem with the existing system and that the alternatives that would then be suggested may be far more radical and unsettling than the creation of Nunavut. The collapse of the major claims cannot be a very happy prospect for either the GNWT or the Government of Canada if they want the legal certainty and political stability that economic development requires.

4. Vague promises to pursue Nunavut after the final settlement are essentially worthless. Financial and administrative concerns, combined with bureaucratic inertia and political forces, will delay progress indefinitely. The result would be that issues fundamental to Inuit, such as language protection and promotion, would be left entirely vulnerable in the hands of the Government of Canada and the existing territorial government in Yellowknife.

The argument against Nunavut, as raised by territorial and federal officials, appears to be that it is too costly and, in any event, the Inuit aren't ready: concerns about the large amounts of money said to be required are presented without documentation, and worries are expressed about the absence of Inuit in the senior ranks of the existing bureaucracy. Ironically, these same two paternalistic arguments were always proffered by Ottawa officials as reasons for not moving the government to Yellowknife and, later, for not devolving powers to it! While the onus is on the GNWT and the Government of Canada to try to defend these positions (if they are going to be used publicly) it is clear that TFN must do a better job of countering both arguments forcefully, in the North and the South.

Timing is critical. If the plebiscite on the boundary is to be conducted in the lifetime of the current N.W.T. Legislative Assembly and proceed to the Inuit ratification vote, it must be held in the spring of 1991, just a few months from now. In order to meet the legal deadline and to pass the current federal government's Nunavut legislation, the ratification vote will have to be held no later than next fall. Everyone admits that there is much work to be done. Not everyone seems to understand the degree of urgency needed to do it.

As Gordon Robertson so eloquently stated at the workshop, the building of Nunavut must be seen as an important national initiative, more central to our current constitutional debate than we may know. Certainly, if the Government cannot manage to provide for Nunavut in the eastern Arctic, the prospects for aboriginal self-government in the rest of the country are dim.

Ron Doering is Chairman of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee

ARTICLE 2

2.8.1 ..."lnuit hereby:

(a) cede, release and surrenderto Her Majesty in Right of Canada,

all their aboriginal claims, rights, title and interests, if any, in and to lands and waters anywhere within Canada and adjacent offshore areas within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Canada, and

(b) agree, on their behalf, and on behalf of their heirs, descendants and successors not to assert any cause of action, action for a declaration, claim or demand of whatever kind or nature which they ever had, now have or may hereafter have against Her Majesty in Right of Canada or any province, the government of any territory or any person based on any aboriginal claims, rights, title or interests in and to lands and waters described in (a)."

ARTICLE 4

4.1.1 Consistent with their long-standing positions, the Government of Canada, the Territorial Government and the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) support in principle the creation of a Nunavut Territory, and the financing of a Nunavut Government, outside of the claims agreement, as soon as possible.

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