

CANADIAN ARCTIC RESOURCES COMMITTEE

PEOPLE AND THE NORTH
MOTIVATIONS, OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH OF THE
CANADIAN ARCTIC RESOURCES COMMITTEE

a report to the

NATIONAL WORKSHOP
ON PEOPLE, RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT NORTH OF '60

by

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PEOPLE AND THE NORTH

"Spontaneous combustion sometimes occurs when combustible material is stored in bulk. It begins with a slow oxidation process which releases enough heat to raise the temperature perceptibly. As additional air seeps through the crevices the temperature is gradually raised until inflammation occurs." (Encyclopedia Britannica).

The Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) resulted from spontaneous combustion. The combustible materials, like many organic compounds, had similar elements but were combined into many different substances. The air that crept in through the crevices to raise the temperature to the inflammation point were the events of February and March, 1971. The events centered around two Cabinet Ministers who were actively shopping for an oil pipeline for the MacKenzie Valley. Shopping in a way that caused concern among many lesser Canadians for the future of native people and environments of the North.

The combustible materials in the pile represented an incredibly complex mix. The debates of the House of Commons suggested that the only really important thing was the question of the ecological hazards posed by the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) and tanker project to the coastal environment of British Columbia. But, actually, that was just the surface layer of the pile. Below the surface were pieces of the continental energy policy and of uncertainty about the availability and price of future oil supplies from the Middle East and South America. The pile also contained fragments from the battle that was being waged by U.S. conservationists over the Alaska Pipeline, and bits of uncertainty about whether enough oil would be discovered in The Mackenzie Delta and Beaufort Sea to justify a separate Canadian Oil Pipeline. Well hidden under the surface of the pile was a big political stick, the need to do dynamic things to achieve full employment or at least to lower the unemployment rate in Canada. The protection at the environment and the legal rights of native people to land and resources of the North were smaller, but highly inflammable, sticks at the bottom of the pile.

THE EVENTS OF FEBRUARY AND MARCH

The pipeline activities seemed to have been stimulated by the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) which were held in Alaska and Washington in February 1971. The hearings reemphasized that there was very strong opposition to the project. It also showed that U.S. conservationists had done their homework well. The United States Department of the Interior's preliminary environmental impact statement took a hard drubbing. It

seemed possible that TAPS might be held up for a long, long time.

Soon after the U.S. hearings were over the Canadian debate started. David Anderson had set the stage. He had made headlines in January when he was reported to have made provocative statements about TAPS to the Atlantic Council, an organization of top business executives that had met in Washington. He stirred the pot still more when he appeared at the pipeline hearings a month later and stated a forthright case against the tanker portion of the TAPS project.

By then a lot of things were beginning to happen. As an editorial in the Globe and Mail stated, "It was, in weeks, a new pipeline game".

On February 14, Mr. Greene spoke at a Canadian Club Meeting in Vancouver, and according to the Globe and Mail, offered the Mackenzie Valley route as an alternative to TAPS. On March 2 he met with high-ranking Nixon administration officials, at an informal luncheon in Washington. Newspaper accounts indicated that he had repeated the offer for a Canadian route.

On March 4, External Affairs Minister Sharpe informed the House of Commons, that he had "expressed the view of the Canadian Government (to the U.S.) that it is very risky to transport oil down the Pacific Coast". In reply to another question asked when he was acting Prime Minister, he stated in part, "I am sure that the national interests of Canada and the United States would be best served if a decision were made not to build the trans-Alaska Pipeline system....."

A Canadian Press story of March 5, stated that Mr. Greene and Mr. Chrétien held widely diverse views on any possible application by oil companies to build a Mackenzie Valley pipeline. But five days later Mr. Chrétien spoke to the Dallas (Texas) section of the Society of Petroleum Engineers. He stated:

"We in Canada would welcome the building of such a gas pipeline, through our country and would do everything that is reasonable to facilitate this particular development.

"With respect to an oil pipeline, it would appear that we are facing a somewhat different situation. An oil pipeline would also be acceptable. In other words, if it is felt desirable to build an oil pipeline from Prudhome Bay direct to the mid-continent market then a right-of-way through Canada, I am sure can, and will be made available".

A rider about precautions to minimize the threat of pollution followed, of course. In the meantime members of the House of Commons were ask-

ing questions every day about the degree of commitment to the building of a Mackenzie Valley pipeline that was indicated by the Ministerial statements. Finally, on March 12 the House of Commons debated the issue on a motion put by Mr. G.W. Baldwin (Peace River). The motion moved was:

"That this House opposes the Trans-Alaska pipeline and tanker project because of the ecological dangers posed by this project to the people, towns, and cities of British Columbia and the national resources of Canada's western seas and coasts and that this House therefore urges the Government to immediately institute an independent economical and ecological feasibility study of alternative routes".

The wording of the motion and the speeches by Mr. Greene and Mr. Chrétien during the debate, both of which stressed the research which was underway, added to the impression that Canada was prepared to make an early deal for a Mackenzie Valley oil pipeline. The impression was strengthened by an announcement by Mr. Chrétien, immediately prior to adjournment of the House, that it was expected that the presidents of seven of the Petroleum Companies, who were sponsoring TAPS would meet with him and Mr. Greene within two weeks.

The next day a headline in the Toronto Star proclaimed "Chrétien says Pipeline from Arctic Inevitable".

The spontaneous combustion that produced the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee occurred that weekend.

On Saturday I was sawing and splitting wood in my backyard. It is an occupation that leaves the mind free so I let it wander over the events of February and March which had culminated in The House debate of the previous day. As I traced the events I began to worry. It seemed to me, that the legitimate fears of thousands of Canadians, over the dangers of super-tankers running aground and ruining the fisheries and the beaches of British Columbia, might result in the building of an oil pipeline long before the native people, the environments of the North or the Canadian economy could cope with it.

That night I made several phone calls and found that I was not alone with my fears. Others believed, as I did, that Canada was a long way from being ready to put hot-oil pipeline or even gas-pipeline signals to GO. But, as a 'conservationist', I found it a tough spot to be in. A year before I had written (about the Manhattan), "The idea of transporting oil through arctic ice packs in 250,000 ton tankers causes ecologists to go green around the gills because sooner or later one will sink" In addition, I didn't, and I still don't, want two oil pipelines in the North American Arctic if one will do the job. However, I accepted that there was no way

that the oil was going to be left in the ground, given the weight of the opposing forces and the kind of world we live in. But surely, I reasoned, there are more ways of getting to the bottom of a precipice than by jumping off the top.

The following week, Prime Minister Trudeau stated in the House of Commons that the government had not made any firm commitment to U.S. interests on construction of a Canadian pipeline. The Hon. Jack Davis, who by then had been designated as Minister of the Environment was finally heard. In a talk at Vancouver he was quoted as stating that he was 90% sure that the building of a corridor for pipelines, a highway and possibly a rail line could begin by 1973.

The same week the public debate began in earnest. On the 16th, the Globe and Mail referred to the incongruities of the situation in a lead editorial entitled, Is this a Rush Job? The next day the Toronto Star also had a lead editorial on the oil pipeline, Don't let's panic on the pipeline, Joe. It pointed out that because TAPS was a bad deal for Canada a Mackenzie Pipeline was not necessarily a good deal. The Globe editorialized again on the subject on March 23 - It Still Spells Rush - in response to a letter in which Mr. Greene responded to the criticism contained in the first 'rush' editorial. The Globe refused to back down. The last paragraph of the editorial read as follows:

"No matter what Mr. Greene says in a letter elsewhere on this page, no matter what any of them say it is apparent that the Cabinet will do anything to persuade U.S. oil interests to take its pipeline down the Mackenzie Valley. Its performance with respect to tankers down the B.C. Coast does not suggest that our Arctic will be very safe".

During the period members of the embryonic Canadian Arctic Resources Committee were attempting to learn about the state of Canada's preparedness for northern development. Some disquieting fact came out:

1. The Northern Land Use Regulations were still in the mill and would not be in force for several months. Many people were dissatisfied with changes, which had been introduced in the final draft, that virtually exempted mining prospecting from controls.
2. Bill C-187, the Yukon Minerals Act, which was being considered by the House as a replacement for the antiquated Yukon Quartz Mining Act, was coming under heavy attack from mining interests and might not be enacted. (It was subsequently withdrawn)
3. The Arctic Land Use Research (ALUR) Program sponsored by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, was beginning its second year.
4. Neither the Canadian Wildlife Service nor the Fisheries Research Board had undertaken any research oriented toward

assessing the environmental impact of the pipeline. Both had programs at a planning stage but neither yet knew what their budgets would be for 1971.

5. The Ecological research programs of Gas Arctic and the Northwest Project Study Group, the gas pipeline consortiums, were still in the process of being organized.
6. Only one man was involved in studies of the effect of oil exploration on the wildlife in the entire Arctic Archipelago, where oil exploration was proceeding at a very rapid pace. There was no evidence that even a minor environmental impact study would be undertaken (none has been) to determine the effect of oil exploration on the environment of the islands.
7. The experimental test pipeline at Inuvik, operated by Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Research Ltd. had just completed its first year of operation in February, although Mr. Greene had said in the debate that, it was "their second winter of complete study". A similar gas pipeline facility at Sans Sault Rapids was under construction and would not be in operation before mid-summer.
8. Environmental protection north of '60 was to be under the direct control of the Northern Economic Development Branch of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development not the Department of the Environment. The Branch was just beginning to hire personnel for its field operations.
9. Panarctic Oils Limited, which holds large acreage under lease in the Arctic Islands, had achieved an unimpressive record in conduct of its operations. It had made two major gas discoveries out of the first eight wells drilled. Both wells had blown out - one on Melville Island and one on King Christian Island. Fortunately for the environment, neither discoveries were crude oil. (Significant changes are said to have occurred in Panarctic's procedures during the past year and we are not aware of any accidents having occurred in recent operations)

The delegation of petroleum executives arrived in Ottawa on March 24 and met for two hours with Mr. Greene and Chretien and lunched later with Mr. Sharpe. The headline in The Globe and Mail the next morning stated, Hopes dim for Mackenzie Oil Pipeline. The article stated:

"Mr. Greene appeared much less optimistic about the likelihood of the oil companies switching to a Canadian route through the Mackenzie Valley than he has been in recent weeks. "In ecological terms, Mr. Greene said, the gas line is potentially much less dangerous to the environment than an oil line. But it was for ecological reasons - fear of a tanker spill on the west coast - that Canada in recent weeks pressed

the U.S. oil companies to consider the Canadian route."

Our analysis of the situation, quite possibly biased by our fears for the future of the North, was essentially similar to that of The Globe and Mail editorial - The Mackenzie Valley would probably have had a hurry-up oil pipeline if the international petroleum executives had opted to put one there. It was possible that the 800 miles of 48-inch pipe stacked at Valdez, Fairbanks and Prudhoe Bay was the most important factor in the reprieve given to The Mackenzie Valley.

It was evident that an oil pipeline would not be built in the immediate future, however, it was evident that a gas pipeline was a certainty, and, as Mr. Davis had stated might be underway by 1973. Our inquiries about the ecological research programs of the two gas pipeline consortiums had indicated that everything was geared for crash programs during the summers of 1971 and 1972. Applications to build a gas pipeline would almost certainly be made in late 1972 or early 1973. It seemed an incredibly early date for as far as we could learn, there was not even adequate background data on caribou populations, the species that had been studied most intensively in the N.W. Territories. In addition, there was nothing that approached a plan for socio-economic development of the North and nothing was being done to come to terms with native claims.

In addition, we were awed by the forces which were bringing pressure to bear for immediate development of the North; we were frightened by the way the power balance in Government, appeared to favour development of the North over socio-economic and environmental concerns; finally we felt a sense of intense frustration over the inability of citizens, and their organizations, to influence decisions or to even understand what was happening north of '60.

David Anderson expressed the problem and the need well in an article in The Globe and Mail - The Pipeline Debate: let the public in. He referred to the alienation caused by a feeling that the "system" was beyond the influence of citizens. He drew comparisons between processes of interaction in the United States under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and suggested that in the case of the pipeline, Canada could present an environmental impact statement in the form of a white paper.

But the need goes far beyond that issue as far as the environment is concerned. It was epitomized by the inadequacy of public participation in the formulation of the Northern Land Use Regulation of the Territorial Lands Act. In this case not even the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development participated in a meaningful way. The Regulations were the subject of consideration by members of a special advisory committee formed by Mr. Chrétien but there was much dissatisfaction about both

the processes of participation and the end product. But this is discussed in considerable detail in the dossier on Legal Problems in the Canadian North so I won't dwell on it here.

By the end of March, we were convinced that Canada badly needed an organization that could provide a pair of eyes that could look in on the North in a more perceptive way than any existing citizen's organization was capable of doing; which could act in an Honest Broker capacity to attempt to ensure that the things that needed to be done in advance of development of whatever type, got done; which could help to bring to the surface the question of what was to be done about the claims of the native people; which could help to overcome the barrier to factual information which existed between the Canadian public and the Government on matters that pertained to development, the native people and the environment.

ORGANIZING THE COMMITTEE AND THE WORKSHOP

The decision to form an organization was made by Dick Passmore, Kitson Vincent and me. In terms of background we were two ecologists and a political scientist. We had, however, discussed the idea with many other people and knew that a feeling for the need to open up decision-making processes and to develop information sources on the North was widespread.

The first decision we made was that we would avoid forming a club for environmental zealots - even though we felt no sense of shame at being, periodically, so classified. The decision to invite people from various areas of society had a simple rationale - we believed that we must attempt to work closely with government and industry and we must try to open a door on the North that was as wide as we could make it. But, we consciously decided against inviting members of government departments or of the two resource industries, mining and petroleum, to be members of the Committee. We thought of our activities as trying to change the straight-line relationships between government and industry in the North into a triangle of interactions between the traditional pair and society-at-large. We reasoned that this could best be achieved by maintaining the organization as a distinct and separate identity.

We realized that not many people would join unless they knew what our objectives were and the nature of the approaches that we intended to use to achieve them. The short-term objectives of the organization were stated earlier and are also given in detail in the statement on the Workshop so I will not repeat them. We were, however, by then referring to long term objectives in this way:

"The long-term objectives of the Committee is to ensure that all interested parties work together to prepare a comprehensive land use plan for the development of the North that takes into account the physical, biological, social and economic aspects of northern development. In this regard the Committee will actively support the application of an integrated, holistic approach to northern development as suggested last year by the Mackenzie Valley Task Force. Finally, it is intended that CARC will perform a functional service for the Canadian public, industry and government while avoiding the emotional and sometimes irrational overtones which have clouded some ecological issues in the past".

In terms of our approach, we concluded that, "Telling it as it is", must be a cherished objective. (However, at the Founding meeting of the Committee the decision was made that we would refrain from public debate until more facts were available. Hence, during the past year we did not issue any news release nor hold any press conferences).

The balance we sought to achieve could perhaps best be paraphrased by the words- Candour but not Confrontation, Frankness but not Rancour. It was on this basis that we invited individuals to join with us to form the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee.

I am grateful that such a distinguished group of Canadians agreed to become members of the Committee.

From the outset we emphasized the need to hold a Workshop which would focus on the needs of the native people and on the protection of the environment. We were almost obsessed with the idea of trying to head-off problems before they occurred. We were so impressed with the rate that exploration and development was proceeding that we even tried to organize a workshop before the 1971 field season. Inability to get funds, and a general insistence that it would interfere with the development of research programs, caused us to drop the idea.

Our concept of the Workshop, and of the supporting dossiers, is given in the information statement on the Workshop and in the memorandum on the Dossiers (Appendix, Item 9). Both are included in the appendix. In brief, we think of this type of activity as being much more functional than a traditional conferences. The explicit purpose of the Workshop is to get those who are experts in their fields to develop definitive statements on areas of strength and weakness in existing knowledge, on needs and priority and on the potential impact of development on the environment or on people. This contrasts sharply with conference, such as the one which was held on Northern Pipelines in February, where people talk at other people and where discussion is often limited or absent because participants

run overtime in making their presentations. However, conferences differ widely in the amount of information they provide and in the degree to which they stimulate public thinging.

The development of the concept of this Workshop was stimulated in part by the Peace -Athabaska Delta symposium which was organized by scientists at the University of Alberta. It provided important insight into the impact of the Bennett Dam on the Delta, caused wide public discussion of the problems and resulted in the establishment of a Task Force which will report July 1. However, the Delta, symposium was held after the fact. Recognition of the inherent dangers in that approach helped to keep us going, even when the odds seemed very high against our being able to hold this Workshop.

The statement on the Workshop points out that the Arctic Development and the Environment (ADE) program of the Arctic Institute of North America has cooperated with us in planning the Workshop. Dr. Max Britton has been a constant source of counsel and Mr. Eric Gourdeau has worked virtually full time on the socio-cultural side of the Workshop for more than two months.

We expected that the cooperation between the Institute and our Committee would include organizing and managing the Workshop and editing, translating and producing the Dossiers. However, financial problems, which are discussed in the next section, forced us to work on an ad hoc basis and prevented us from working out this area of cooperation with the Institute. Nevertheless, the help we received made an important contribution to our efforts. Item 6 in the Appendix provides more detail on the original plan for cooperation.

Our original concept also included an ambitious plan to hold a preparatory meeting of native people prior to the Workshop. It was another aspect of the Workshop activities which we had to scale down significantly because of limited funds.

FINANCING THE PROGRAM

Financing CARC has been a cliff-hanging operation. From the day the spontaneous combustion occurred that got us started to today (May 21), we have seldom been able to predict whether or not we would be able to bring off the next phase of our operation. In fact, it was May 1 before we were certain that we would not have to call off the Workshop. It was perhaps a healthy thing, however, I admit to having experienced considerable frustration over having to plan, having to ask individuals to assist us and having to make financial committments under such circumstances.

When we began to organize the Committee in April 1971 we considered ways and means of getting money to get started. We were all actively involved in citizens conservation organizations and were aware of the

difficulties of raising money for such activities in Canada.

Because of this, we contacted the National Audubon Society in New York about the possibility of obtaining assistance from conservation organizations in the United States. Mr. Charles Callison, Executive Vice-President of the Society, worked out arrangements for us to make a presentation to the Natural Resources Council of America (NRCA has over 60 members 3 organizations and has its headquarters in Washington:). We drew up a preliminary plan for operations based on a budget of approximately \$20,000.00 and presented it to a meeting of the Council in Washington on April 14. We hoped that member organizations of NRCA would make small contributions and that we would obtain a substantial portion of the proposed budget. Within a couple of weeks we received a total of The Sierra Club contributed \$2,000.00 and the National Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society and the NRCA \$1,000.00. This money was our principal source of operating funds during the summer.

We made a second appeal for assistance to U.S. Conservation organizations in early April of this year. At the time it appeared that we were not going to be able to finance the Workshop (See Appendix, Item 4). The National Audubon Society and the Wilderness Society again contributed \$1,000.00 each and the NRCA \$500.00.

It is perhaps significant that the organizations of NRCA that offered us assistance each time were those that are supported by naturalists and which are working most actively for environmental causes in the United States.

In making the appeals, we anticipated that we would be assisted by the Natural Wildlife Federation, (a large hunter-oriented organization which has an annual budget of \$7 million) and other organizations which share strong interests and concerns for species, such as waterfowl, which are truly continental resources. However, our hopes were not realized.

In making presentations, we attempted to bring out that the primary goal of our Committee would be to work to achieve the best solutions for North America not to obstruct or boost any particular project. However, I came away from discussions with the realization that protection of the Mackenzie Valley had a much lower priority in the minds of many U.S. conservationists than protection of Alaska. I suppose it is naive, or at best, unrealistic, to think that it might be otherwise.

Financing was a principal topic of discussion at the founding meeting of CARC on June 8. Strong sentiment was expressed in favour of depending entirely on Canadian sources for financial support. Some members expressed reservations about continuing with the Committee, if its fund raising activities were directed to any major extent toward the U.S.

We agreed that our financial campaign would be concentrated in Canada. A decision was also made to conduct the greater portion of the campaign in September and October. Mr. Steele Curry joined the Committee in August and agreed to organize and conduct the financial campaign in cooperation with Kitson Vincent, who by then had become the Executive Secretary of the Committee. I agreed to provide additional support whenever it was considered desirable.

The campaign was based on the concept that we should attempt to obtain one-third of the funds from government, one-third from the petroleum and pipeline industry and one-third from industry of other types and from private foundations. Steele Curry was an executive of a financial house, at the time. His approach was professional and the campaign a very thorough one.

I was cautiously optimistic at the outset although I was aware that we were breaking new ground in our approach to conservation activities in Canada. My optimism was based partly on the nature of the financial campaign that we were conducting and partly on what I thought the temper of the times to be. Some of the major corporations we were approaching were spending large sums on advertising programs to convince the public of the seriousness of their concern for protection of the environment. In addition, the Federal Government had used the term 'participatory democracy' quite liberally and sometimes made specific reference to the need for 'public participation. Mr. Greene, for example, made reference to the topic in an address in Vancouver on April 1, 1971 (Greene forecasts pipeline to be great debate of 70s, Globe and Mail, April 2, 1971). Two paragraphs of the article read as follows:

"Because of public questioning under way into the ethic of growth and whether growth for its own sake is the be all and end all, and with the matter of the pipelines coming to the forefront, pipelines in the North will be among the critical and great issues in the years ahead.

"He regards it as his function to stimulate public dialogue and discussion on these matters. The assistance of an informed public opinion is needed to help government make sound and lasting decisions".

The approach to petroleum and pipeline companies was made through two letters (Appendix- Item 2) and a meeting with senior executives. All the major companies were contacted. In addition, we made two presentations to the Arctic Petroleum Operators Association (APOA) at Calgary. The first one was to a committee and the second to the full association. Dr. Ian McTaggart Cowan represented the technical side of our interests at the second meeting. I was involved in the meeting with the Committee.

Our meeting with Imperial Oil was a very forthright one. It was made clear to us that as far as the Company was concerned, the public interest was represented by Government and no support would be provided CARC. We were very disappointed because we had gained the impression, from discussions we had with a number of people, that Imperial's response might have considerable influence on the decision made by other companies.

We managed to arrange a second meeting and this time made a presentation to a number of senior executives including the President J.A. Armstrong and the General Manager W.O. Twaits. Dr. Kenneth Hare joined Curry, Vincent and me for this meeting. Although it continued to be evident that the Company did not agree with the role we were attempting to play, we were finally told that the Company's decision would be reconsidered if we received substantial support from the Federal Government. Up to the present time, we have not received any financial support from any petroleum or pipeline company.

It was evident, in our discussions, that the amounts of money we requested was not an issue. It was clearly a matter of principle about dealing with a group of people who were attempting to act in the public interest, in the way that we had set out to do.

Similarly the mining companies we approached declined to assist CARC. However, one company informed us that we would receive a grant of \$5,000.00 if we received support from the petroleum industry.

Our request to the Federal Government for financial support was made to Mr. Chrétien, Minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, (Appendix, Item 3). We sent copies of our request to Mr. Greene and to Mr. Davis and invited them to support it. Several members of our Committee also made specific representations to members of Cabinet urging them to support the request.

The request was not made until late October. We had delayed deliberately because we had anticipated receiving some support from industry and had thought that this would enhance the possibility of obtaining Government support.

We finally succeeded in arranging a meeting with Mr. Chrétien on December 1. We were told that no grant could be made but that it might be possible to obtain support through a contractual arrangement. A few days prior to the meeting we had been given a copy of a document entitled Background Activities on the Seminar on Guidelines for Northern Scientific Activities. It was dated November 19, 1971. We were told that support would depend on our being able to undertake activities that were associated with the Seminar.

The purpose of the Seminar was stated: "to assist with developing guidelines and priorities for scientific activities in Northern Canada that would enhance programs related to the people, the environment, renewable resources, and non-renewable resources in that order of importance".

The outline specified six major areas, the four mentioned above and technology and international research. Each area was to have a background

paper of approximately 10,000 words. The annex on technology stated that the background paper should include Town Planning, Buildings, Services, Roads, Airstrips, Pipelines, Communications and Navigation, Marine and River Facilities, Construction Materials and Methods. The area of coverage for non-renewable resources was also a broad one. It was to cover discovery, development, extraction, and transportation in addition to the effect of their development on the environment and on local people.

After consultation with a member of a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND) we made a presentation to a working group of the Advisory Committee on December 10th. At it, we proposed that the activities of our Workshop (for which we offered a revised proposal) should be integrated with that of the Seminar. The proposal was that the Workshop deal with questions pertaining to environment, renewable resources and people and the Seminar deal with non-renewable resources, technology and international research.

The proposal was turned down. It was made clear that the requirements of the contract would be that all topics be covered and the Seminar guidelines would be adhered to. This was unacceptable to us for several reasons, but principally because it would not have allowed us to place the emphasis which we considered was warranted, on legal problems and on native people.

Subsequently, we were offered the opportunity to provide the background papers (based on contracts for \$5,000.00 each) on renewable resources and the natural environment for the ACND Seminar. We declined because it would have offered us very little in terms of net financial return and would have used up the energy we required for the Workshop.

(The background on our contacts with the Federal Government is covered in more detail in the Appendix in Items 3, 5 and 8. It should be borne in mind that my memo to the Committee (Item 8) reflects the disappointment and frustration I felt, after a long, fruitless attempt to come to terms with the Government's requirements for support of the Workshop. I stated in it that I considered that the Seminar had been hurriedly conceived to make our Workshop appear to be redundant. I have since been told that the Seminar had been in the offing for sometime. At this time, I am not certain whether the work on the preparation of the Seminar outline was hurried along because of our proposal to hold a Workshop or not - at any rate I had not heard about it in any of my discussions about the need for such activities on the North.)

While we failed to win support from the petroleum or mining industries or the Government we obtained some support from organizations that were less directly involved in northern affairs. This support included a Conservation Grant of \$2,500.00 from the White Owl Conservation Award Committee. The

details will be published in the Proceedings of the Workshop.

By the end of the year I began to feel that we could not obtain enough funds to mount the Workshop, however, other members of the Committee encouraged us to continue our efforts, I was also encouraged when a number of people indicated that they would, if necessary, compile Dossiers for the Workshop on an expense-only basis. Much of the work on the Dossiers has been done on this basis.

In the third phase (from January to the present time) of our financial campaign we succeeded in raising approximately \$23,000.00. This included assurance of a grant of \$5,000.00 from the Canadian National Sportsman's Show, for publication of the proceedings of the Workshop, and a grant of \$1,000.00 from the World Wildlife Fund. In addition, we expect to receive two other grants of \$20,000.00 each. One of these is conditional; we will receive it when we have raised an additional \$50,000.00. This is the additional sum the grantor considered was necessary for CARC to conduct the Workshop and maintain a viable operation for a year. At the time writing we required \$7,000.00 to qualify for it.

During this third phase of our financial campaign we turned again to the Federal Government. We applied for a grant for \$25,000.00 from the Secretary of State for support of the Workshop and for a small contract with the Science Council for delivery of background papers. Both were denied.

Since January fund raising activities have been done mainly by Kitson Vincent. Steele Curry assumed a new position in Calgary at the end of the year and resigned as chairman of the Finance Committee at that time.

IN RETROSPECT

In a memorandum to the Committee I described CARC as a social experiment. In retrospect, I think that the description was an apt one.

In the first place, it was an attempt to form an organization which would further public participation in quite different ways. Those of us who conceived of the organization had often taken adversary positions on government policies on resource and environmental matters. But, we recognized that significant things appeared to be happening to attitudes and approaches toward both the environment and the native people. We reasoned, if attitudes in government and industry had changed perhaps it was possible to achieve results through processes of reason rather than of confrontation.

In the second place, there are not many organizations where people with a wide diversity of background work together to further the cause of

The native people or the environment. We hoped to add a little to the development of that type of organization.

But the experiment goes beyond that. It seemed to us that there are at least two fundamental problems which must be faced if Canadian society is to come to terms with socio-cultural and environmental problems. One is the need for much greater day-to-day participation by people in decision-making processes. The other is honouring the right of people to know. (I apologize for the cliché - I know of no phrase that states the case better). Government in Canada is not finding it easy to come to terms with these problems. Part of the experiment has been to determine if CARC could do anything to speed up the process of letting the people in on decisions in the North. As far as I am concerned that is what the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee is mostly about.

It is difficult to be certain whether or not this Workshop will make a significant contribution to the cause or not. We were not very successful in getting financial support from the government or the industries most directly involved in the North. Both, however, will be ably represented in the working sessions and Mr. Chrétien will speak to us tonight. So I express pleasure about the latter and reserve judgement on the former. I am sure that the success of the Workshop will be judged by what we accomplish, not by who pays for it.

I once described myself as a realistic idealist. Assuming that role for a moment, I have to admit that it was not very realistic to have expected the petroleum-centered industries or the Federal Government to welcome CARC with open pocket books. After all, the companies we solicited money from have blood brothers, or fathers, who were badly stung by rather similar mosquitoes in Alaska. We claimed that we were not after as much blood. But who would be certain what might happen if we were given the chance to sting? And what would the reflections of Standard Oil be if Imperial Oil contributed funds to an organization that had the remotest similarity to the Wilderness Society or the Sierra Club - two of the Alaskan mosquitoes.

In terms of realism, some similar things can be said about our attempts to obtain financial support from the Federal Government. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Department of Energy, Mines & Resources have been active in promoting the development of the North. Several members of our Committee have been critical on many occasions of northern policies and programs. It was not very realistic to expect that the

Government would support an organization which included such people. We ran into opposition within the Civil Service, in areas where we least expected it. It caused us to reflect on the strength of aggressive instincts when territorial boundaries are being transgressed. It was another element of realism that we should have been more attuned to.

But in terms of realism, there was another side too. In 1968, a government was elected that had included participatory democracy as a plank in its election platform. In retrospect, I consider that it provided the license for some of our lack of realism.

Time lends perspective. It is interesting to look back over events of the past three years and see how environmental activism has shaped events in Canada. There has been confrontation over issues on several occasions. Many people consider that it is a poor way of doing things, others have argued that there was no other way. Time will lend perspective - even if it will not be able to provide a black or white answer.

But, to return to the North, I feel certain that some things will not change. One of these is the increasing interest of people in the South for the place of the people who were there first. Another is an increasing awareness of the need to protect its fragile environments. One of the unanswered questions is whether people will be encouraged to help shape events or not. David Anderson said -- Let the People in. Is there a reasonable alternative? Time will tell. Eventually People and the North will know.